The links between climate action and social justice are well established, though too rarely acknowledged or upheld. SEI’s Emissions Inequality Dashboard clearly shows how the poorest people, and those who are most vulnerable and marginalized, have done the least to cause climate change yet have the fewest resources to navigate its effects. Income inequality, in effect, translates into emissions inequality.

Bold and ambitious action on climate change – both mitigation and adaptation – can help to reduce inequity. But that does not make climate action inherently virtuous. It has to be designed with equity in mind, or policymakers must face the trade-offs that otherwise result.

Equity should not be seen simply as an end result of climate action; it is an integral approach within such a journey. In 2026, it will be needed more than ever, as we see growing mistrust and inequality within as well as between countries. How climate action is designed can either aggravate that trend or offer some of the most powerful remedies.

Getting this right could rebuild trust in ongoing multilateral efforts – in short supply at COP30, despite some of the strongest rights-based language ever seen in a COP decision – and build support for climate action across all scales.

Fixing the problem or shifting it elsewhere?

Climate adaptation is vital for safeguarding people, places and economies in a warming world – but it can also cause unintended harm. Local adaptation measures could, for example, benefit some residents in a neighbourhood while disadvantaging others, such as when informal settlements are razed to make room for sea walls to protect other residential areas.

This kind of “maladaptation”, where risks are shifted from one group to another, occurs all the way up to the global scale, reinforcing asymmetries and inequities. Diverting supply chains, foreign investments or insurance coverage away from climate-risky areas are other examples. Such responses compound the impact from climate change by eroding a region’s adaptive capacity, jeopardizing livelihoods and amplifying systemic risk as places become less viable for established economic activities.

Policy solutions, locally and nationally as well as globally, exist to avoid these outcomes. Adaptation planning should always screen for potential maladaptive outcomes as early as possible while also recognizing its limits. Beyond immediate effects, system interlinkages and dynamic risk interactions tend to be forgotten, but addressing these from the outset could have even more dramatic effects. All relevant stakeholders must be involved for effective assessments, including those not directly targeted by adaptation measures and programs. SEI research explores how this can be achieved, highlighting intersectional perspectives on adaptation outcomes, including gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age and disability, and how financiers can improve outcomes.

Cross-border impacts

Some countries’ climate mitigation policies put others at a disadvantage. A recent shift in climate strategies has seen countries increasingly turning to green industrial policy to achieve their goals, with knock-on effects on other countries’ economies and development. For example, China’s successful production of electric vehicles and solar panels, a boon for lower carbon emissions as these flood markets at lower prices, have also triggered debate over whether subsidies hamper development of production elsewhere.

In 2026, we can expect continued heated discussions about climate-focused trade measures, such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and similar ideas in other major economies. While domestic carbon pricing and instruments like CBAM can be powerful drivers of decarbonization, they carry the risks of leaving emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) behind. Global climate ambitions will falter with a “two-speed transition”, in which advanced economies surge ahead while many EMDEs face barriers to inclusion in new green value chains and adoption of energy transition technologies.

SEI research has, however, found that reversing this trend is possible if high-income countries can align their green industrial policies with principles of global fairness, mutual benefit, and coherence with global climate targets. Green subsidies can, for example, be linked to preferential licencing and technology sharing with EMDEs. Technology transfer can be enabled through joint innovation, collaborative R&D across borders, and fair integration into green value chains. At the international level, financial actors can scale up climate finance for low-emissions industrial development and countries can ensure that trade policies are inclusive.

The new goldrush

The most recent IEA World Energy Outlook predicts that renewables, especially solar power, will grow faster than any other major energy source, in line with the Global Stocktake decision to triple global renewable energy capacity by 2030. But this comes with a new set of challenges.

The interest in renewables does not necessarily signal the hoped-for shift away from other, dirtier energy sources. The IEA expects energy production in general to continue increasing, driven by growing demand, partly linked to the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI).

In addition, the renewables boom could significantly intensify the extraction and processing of critical minerals on land and at sea. While land-based mining remains a key issue, the controversial topic of deep-sea mining will rise on global agendas in 2026, when the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is expected to finalize its Mining Code and start receiving applications for actual mining on an industry scale. Opposition is mounting, however, since the ecological consequences of disturbing deep-sea ecosystems remain largely unknown; 33 countries call for a moratorium until adequate scientific knowledge and safeguards are in place.

Countries will need to strengthen anticipatory measures to reduce risks from critical minerals mining, for example, through effective policy coordination and coherence. This will require a new mindset that looks out for cascading risks and trade-offs, not only opportunities for synergies and benefits, that account for the adverse outcomes of climate and sustainable development policies.

Upholding Indigenous rights will be especially critical. SEI research shows that current measures to manage conflicts are insufficient and often fail to protect Indigenous rights in a way that further jeopardizes the green transition. One example is the frequent use of confidential agreements between wind power companies and reindeer herding Sámi communities, with open-ended consent and gag clauses that prevent communities from speaking out about their concerns.

Policymakers can address this by embedding rights-based approaches in land-use planning and permitting to advance climate action, protect and restore biodiversity, and safeguard local and Indigenous communities and their livelihoods. Recognizing the rights of nature further complements climate action that is inclusive, just and ecologically grounded.

Balancing needs and finding new ways forward

In 2026, tensions over these risks and related questions will manifest themselves both between and within countries. Climate and biodiversity issues will dovetail, locally and internationally, with Indigenous rights on centre stage.

While Türkiye, holding the presidency for the climate COP31, is likely to prioritize green industrialization, Australia, which is leading negotiations, could be expected to push topics related to renewables and highlight the role of Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity COP17 will follow up on progress at COP16, including a call to create a permanent “subsidiary body” to increase the participation of Indigenous Peoples and the Cali Fund, to which private corporations should contribute when tapping genetic resources under the stewardship of Indigenous communities.

Another development to look out for will be the first call for funding for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. The question remains as to whether it will meaningfully address the urgent funding needs of climate-vulnerable developing countries and communities for rebuilding and adapting following a climate disaster.

Also of interest will be the first court cases that refer to last year’s advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which concluded that countries are legally obliged to protect and prevent harm to the environment and must address greenhouse gas emissions to slow climate change. The ruling was unpacked in detail by SEI experts.

At the same time, we see a growing backlash against environmental policies. The “greenlash” sometimes reflects inequality and genuine public concerns, but it is often fuelled by actors who exploit rising climate misinformation, a topic which was for the first time part of the formal agenda at the climate COP30. Concerned about domestic backlash, governments might pivot to politically safer investments in tackling inequality – healthcare, education, tax cuts – and diminish their efforts for climate finance and action accordingly.

One way to face the greenlash in 2026 is to advance the recognition that climate investment is social investment. The groups most exposed to climate risks – low-income households, rural residents and people already facing exclusion – are typically groups with poorer health outcomes, limited mobility options and more constrained food security and living environments. Their living conditions could improve through climate-related investments that bring cleaner air, safer streets, resilient public transport, affordable clean energy, healthier diets and more active lifestyles. The transition away from fossil fuels can – under certain conditions – also create opportunities for reskilling and improved working conditions.

In 2026, policymakers will need to manage real trade-offs while recognizing that climate inaction and greenlash amplify and create inequalities on a far greater scale. The defining task will be to make equity the guiding principle to meet climate and biodiversity goals for a just transition.